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ABSTRACT
This research used open source information to investigate the moti-
vational backgrounds of 219 suicide attackers from various regions of
the world. We inquired as to whether the attackers exhibited evi-
dence for significance quest as a motive for their actions, and
whether the eradication of significance loss and/or the aspiration for
significance gain systematically differed according to attackers’ demo-
graphics. It was found that the specific nature of the significance
quest motive varied in accordance with attackers’ gender, age, and
education. Whereas Arab-Palestinians, males, younger attackers, and
more educated attackers seem to have been motivated primarily by
the possibility of significance gain, women, older attackers, those
with little education, and those hailing from other regions seem to
have been motivated primarily by the eradication of significance loss.
Analyses also suggested that the stronger an attacker’s significance
quest motive, the greater the effectiveness of their attack, as mea-
sured by the number of casualties. Methodological limitations of the





The phenomenon of suicide and the motivations behind suicide have been of consider-
able interest to social scientists,1 as suicide contradicts life’s most prepotent instinct to
survive and escape death.2 On the surface, then, it seems perplexing that suicide
bombing is the weapon of choice for terrorist organizations.3 From the organizational
perspective, however, suicide bombers are an inexpensive yet highly effective weapon,4
accounting for only 4% of all terrorist attacks, yet fully 32% of terrorism-related deaths.5
Beyond sheer effectiveness, various propositions have been made regarding the organi-
zational motivation behind suicide attacks, including a) removal of foreign occupational
forces from one’s homeland,6 b) collapsing emerging democratic structures and sparking
violence between non-state actors,7 and signaling either c) the organizations’ determina-
tion to use violence,8 or d) intense commitment to the cause in an effort to “outbid”
other insurgent groups.9 Thus, in situations of asymmetric conflict, suicide attacks may
function to level the playing field, and provide the best advantage to the weaker party in
an imbalanced situation.
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Questions remain, however, regarding how organizations convince individuals to
sacrifice their lives in suicide attacks and (relatedly) why individuals allow themselves to
be so convinced. Whereas suicide might make sense for individuals who feel they have
nothing to live for (e.g., those who perceive themselves as burdensome, perhaps due to
depression, illness, or incapacitation10), researchers have pointed out that suicide bombers
are relatively “normal” and neither suicidal nor particularly depressed.11
Although systematic empirical examinations of extremists’ motivations are sparse, it is
generally recognized that understanding the radicalization process requires moving
beyond the organizational objectives, and examining the interplay of motives at various
levels of analysis. For instance, Pape, who views organizations that launch suicide attacks
as reacting primarily to foreign occupation,12 also sees suicide terrorism as grounded in
mass support at the social level, and an instance of altruistic suicide13 (i.e., self sacrifice on
behalf of others) at the individual level. Hafez likewise identified the individual motiva-
tional, organizational, and societal levels14 involved in suicidal terrorism, and more
recently, Kruglanski and colleagues emphasized the interplay between individual-motiva-
tional, social, and cultural/ideological processes in terrorism more generally.15
The quest for personal significance as the motivation for suicide attacks
The latter authors’ significance quest theory16 (SQT) suggests that at the individual level
there might exist a common core in the panoply of previously identified reasons for
attackers’ sacrifice. These reasons have included honor, dedication to the leader, social
status, glamour, personal loss, group pressure, humiliation, vengeance, restoration of
Islam to its glory, monetary benefits, desire to enter heaven, and even feminism.17
Ricolfi referred to such a conglomeration of reasons as “a cocktail of feelings . . . desire
for revenge, resentment, and a sense of obligation toward the victims.”18
Though all the above reasons are likely to constitute valid descriptions of specific cases,
their common motivational core according to SQT, however, is the quest for personal
significance—the desire to count, to be someone, to be recognized, to matter in the eyes of
one’s group, according to its (sacred) values.19 Consider how the quest for personal
significance may apply to the previously listed motives for suicidal terrorism. One could
want revenge against those who have caused harm to them, their family members, or their
group. The previously bestowed harm renders one powerless, reduces one’s sense of value
or esteem, and lowers one’s sense of mattering and significance. Vengeance enables one to
reciprocate the humiliation, thus providing an opportunity to restore one’s lost signifi-
cance, and hence level the playing field. Group pressure (akin to Pape’s notion of “mass
support”) suggests that, in the eyes of others, one’s significance would rise upon accep-
tance of the mission and decline upon its refusal. Dedication to the leader signifies that
one’s suicide would be respected by an admired figure, conferring considerable signifi-
cance upon oneself.20 Social status and glory directly represent the attainment of signifi-
cance, monetary support for family ensures their gratitude and adoration, and entrance to
heaven symbolizes recognition afforded to particularly deserving, and hence, significant,
individuals. As can be seen then, the concept of significance quest serves to integrate
under a common umbrella a variety of seemingly disparate motivations mentioned in
connection with suicide attacks.




























Arousal of significance quest
Significance loss
As with any motivational force,21 the need for personal significance must be activated to
influence behavior. SQT identifies three intertwined conditions for such arousal.22 The
first is significance loss, that is, humiliation or dishonor of some kind. Instances of
humiliation reduce one’s significance below normal levels, and motivate behavior aimed
at restoring or augmenting it. Significance loss might result from an affront to one’s social
identity (e.g., religious, ethnic, or national). In this vein, terrorist propagandists (e.g., Al
Qaeda’s Anwar al Awlaki, or Yehia al Libi) often allude to injustice experienced by
Muslims in remote world locations (e.g., Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria) to imply
that Muslims everywhere share their humiliation. Significance loss can also arise from a
person’s unique humiliation that may be unrelated to category membership, for instance,
personal failure or transgression against an important social norm. This can be seen in
Palestinian suicide attackers who volunteered after suffering stigma in their community as
a result of personal circumstances (e.g., infertility, divorce, extramarital affair, HIV
diagnosis).23 These personal circumstances had little to do with the attackers’
Palestinian identity or with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, yet they were perceived as
losses of self-worth that could be redeemed by sacrifice on behalf of one’s group.
Note that the concept of significance loss is similar in some sense to relative depriva-
tion, which has been used to explain why individuals engage in such forms of collective
action as violent forms of protest or civil disobedience.24 Relative deprivation refers to a
comparison process whereby one perceives the self (egoistic deprivation) or the ingroup to
which one belongs (fraternal deprivation) as not being granted what they deserve. This
implies that one is slighted, not treated with the respect that one merits, prompting a sense
that others regard one as insignificant. In turn, the latter may evoke feelings of anger and
resentment, and motivate behavior aimed at restoring the imbalance.
Yet, SQT and relative deprivation theories differ in a couple major respects. First,
relative deprivation refers to the case where one feels unjustly disrespected by others,
whereas the loss of significance notion pertains also to cases where one’s sense of
insignificance was brought upon oneself by dint of one’s own regretful and inappropriate
(e.g., sinful) actions for which one wishes to expiate. Secondly, according to relative
deprivation theory, only deprivation related to one’s group membership may potentiate
action on behalf of the collective, so that “feeling deprived may inspire participation in
collective behavior, but only if the person feels deprived on behalf of a relevant reference
group.”25 SQT suggests, instead, that individual-based loss having little to do with group
deprivation can induce feelings of insignificance and a search for opportunities for
significance restoration. Such search may focus one onto what is important for the
ingroup, and the means offered by the group for enhancing one’s significance. In cases
of intergroup conflict, typically, an important road to significance is the readiness to
sacrifice oneself for the group’s cause in fighting its enemies. It is in this way that the loss
of personal or group-based significance may contribute to extreme group-based action.26
In essence then, whereas relative deprivation may induce a sense of significance loss, not
all significance loss is based on relative deprivation. Hence, the significance loss concept
represents the broader motivational category of which relative deprivation is a special case.





























Closely related to actual loss of significance is potential loss that would be experienced
should one refuse a suicide mission. Persons who pride themselves on their commitment
to a group would suffer humiliation and accusations of hypocrisy/inauthenticity in case
they refrained from risking their lives in defense of their group’s cause. Japanese Kamikaze
pilots of World War II, for instance, had little appetite for dying, nor did they expect
rewards in the afterlife.27 They volunteered, nonetheless, because rejecting the call to duty
would have bestowed upon them and their families vast dishonor, more intolerable,
apparently, than an honorable demise.
Opportunity for significance gain
Often times, the primary motive may not be the undoing of an unusual personal misery or
humiliation. Suicide attackers may not be destitute, poorly educated, nor suffering from
abuse or discrimination, but instead seemingly well-to-do with excellent future prospects.
These individuals may not experience any particular sense of personal humiliation or pain
of disrespect from others. Instead, such attackers are often motivated by the allure of
becoming a celebrated hero or “larger than life figure.”28 Rallying to the defense of their
group and joining the ranks of suicide attackers affords this opportunity for glorious
significance that may prove irresistible. The motive here may not be to simply move away
from feelings of insignificance, as may be the case with significance loss, but to move
toward superstardom, that is, great significance that normal life circumstances can rarely
afford.
It will be noted too, that opportunities for significance gain are not restricted to the
grievances of one’s own group and may also arise from the apparent injustice to other
groups, or even to occurrences unrelated to group phenomena altogether. For instance,
large numbers of foreign nationals volunteered for the Spanish Civil War to fight on
behalf of the Nationalists or the Republicans even though the issues at stake did not
involve their own groups or social identities.29 Similarly, Lord Byron and other European
intellectuals volunteered to fight along with Greek revolutionaries in the Greek indepen-
dence war.30 In yet other instances, an opportunity for significance gain may entail heroic
acts on behalf of individuals in distress, or generally any acts in defense of one’s culture’s
sacred values.31 In brief then, although significance loss often offers opportunities for
significance gain—it isn’t an exclusive source of such opportunities. Accordingly, in the
present study we empirically separated attackers’ reasons in the significance loss category
from those related to significance gain in order to observe whether they systematically
differed between different types of suicide bombers.
Interplay of motivation, ideology, and social processes: The three Ns of
radicalization
SQT proposes that the decision to become a suicide attacker represents a conjunction of
three factors: a) Need: the motivation to gain (or restore) personal significance as proposed
above, b) Narrative of the ideology that touts a suicidal mission as a superior, significance-




























bestowing, means to that end, and c) Networks governed by the social process of group
dynamics that persuade the individual to embrace the ideology.
We have already discussed the Need part of that conjunction, namely the quest for
significance described earlier. Such motivation defines a goal of significance gain or
restoration, whereas the ideological Narrative identifies a means of attaining that goal.
Specifically, when one’s group is dealt a humiliating blow that insults its sacred values,32
an ideology might require its adherents to come to the group’s defense and avenge the
affront. The ideology also pledges significance and honor to those who put the group first,
the greatest honor going to those who are willing to give all and offer their lives for the
cause.
Finally, persuasive force (the Network aspect mentioned above) applied by the social
process to which one is exposed is also required to get an individual to commit him or
herself to the ultimate sacrifice.33 Because individuals’ beliefs are anchored in the shared
reality of groups34 to which they belong, they can be persuaded that suicide for a cause is a
legitimate and admirable tool of struggle, particularly if they experienced a loss of
significance of some sort and saw suicide for the group as an effective way to significance
boost. Such persuasion processes can transpire spontaneously and naturally within a
group of friends (a “bunch of guys”35), but they can also be engineered by organizations
that identify susceptible candidates and dispatch recruiters to exploit their vulnerability.
Indeed, suicide terrorists, relative to non-suicide terrorists and organizers of suicide
attacks, had “characteristics [that] converge on a [avoidant and dependent] personality
style and ego structure that is susceptible to social influence, especially by persons
perceived as authoritative.”36 Attackers were further described as “longing for interperso-
nal relationships” and “always in need of reassurance” (i.e., with shaky sense of personal
significance), qualities that would make them more susceptible to the influence of both
friends within their social network or organizational recruiters.37
Manifestations of significance quest as a function of demographics
With the foregoing notions in mind, we approached a database of suicide attackers and
explored the motivational underpinnings of their actions. Our goal was not to identify
what motivates one to become a suicide attacker relative to other terrorists. Instead, we
aimed to catalogue various motivating circumstances of suicide attackers, using the quest
for significance framework as a conceptual tool, to help determine if these motivating
circumstances differed systematically for attackers with various demographic character-
istics. We also examined if the degree of suicide attackers’ quest motivation was related to
the potency of their attack. Attackers with the greatest yearning for significance may also
feel like they have more riding on their actions, which would increase their motivation
and ultimately translate into their greater effectiveness as attackers.
Past research supporting the basic tenets of SQT has largely focused on significance
loss. Work with former members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), for
instance, found that self-reported feelings of insignificance were correlated with support of
the violent struggle against the Sinhalese majority.38 Likewise, feelings of insignificance
have been found to correlate with and increase one’s identification as a group member,39
which subsequently increased one’s willingness to self-sacrifice on the group’s behalf.40
The present effort, however, examined both significance loss and significance gain.




























Moreover, whereas past research, like that conducted with the LTTE, utilized samples of
former radicals and relied on their self-reports, the present study provided a unique
opportunity to examine actual suicide attackers via their depictions in open-source
materials.
Some critics of SQT argued that if most motivations of extremists can be interpreted as
significance seeking, then the concept has little explanatory power or practical
application.41 In response, we have suggested that the theory’s utility lies in its (falsifiable)
identification of the general conditions under which significance quest would be aroused,
notably when significance is lost or the opportunity for significance gain presents itself, as
documented elsewhere.42 Particularly in the present analyses, this distinction between loss
and gain leads to interesting hypotheses that would be obscured without the assumption
of a common underlying motive. We derive these hypotheses from an extensive psycho-
logical literature that has established clear differences in approach (gain) and avoidance
(loss) motivations across a variety of demographic characteristics.43 We therefore expect
the same differences to characterize the motivations of suicide attackers, as outlined below.
Gender
Psychological research on gender differences in approach-avoidance motivations suggests
that female suicide attackers may be more likely than males to suffer significance loss,
perhaps prompting their decision to embark on a suicide mission. A number of studies
have found that women, relative to men, have higher Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS)
scale scores (related to loss motivation), and lower scores than men on several subscales of
the Behavioral Approach System (related to gain motivation), though not on the overall
BAS score.44 Moreover, whereas men tend to construe themselves in terms of collectives
or groups, women tend to construe themselves in terms of close interpersonal
relationships.45 This suggests that female suicide attackers should be more likely to
experience and respond to varieties of significance loss related to relational concerns,
such as violent death of a family member at the hands of the enemy.46
Educational level
Well-educated attackers may be more likely to exhibit a significance gain motivation.
Initiating and achieving higher education goals likely requires an appetitive self-regulatory
motivation, due to the focus on the ultimate reward of a degree and a fruitful career, as
well as the drive required to maintain one’s efforts toward that goal, two key components
of the BAS.47
Age
Research from several domains of inquiry suggests that older (vs. younger) suicide
attackers may be more likely to experience a significance loss (vs. gain) motivation.
First, older people place greater emphasis on loss-prevention or maintenance goals,
whereas younger people focus more on personal growth or gain goals.48 Likewise, research
on regulatory focus in the health domain has found that younger individuals are more
motivated by promotion concerns, whereas older individuals are equally or more




























motivated by prevention concerns.49 Secondly, research has shown that older adults are
less likely to engage in a search for meaning or purpose in life (reflecting concern with
significance gain), as they are likely already in possession of such a sense.50 Accordingly,
younger attackers may be more likely to have had personal circumstances that indicate the
quest for significance gain (e.g., seeking honor and purpose/meaning in life), whereas
older attackers may be more attuned to significance loss experiences.
Family status
Lastly, attackers’ family situation (i.e., marital status and number of children) may relate to
the type of significance quest they evinced prior to the attack. Attackers who are married
or have children, in essence, have “more to lose” than their single and childless counter-
parts. This may instill a motivational orientation whereby one is more concerned with
losing what one has, and less concerned with what might be gained. Thus, married
attackers and those with children may prove especially sensitive to the possibility of
significance loss, and to be motivated by the desire to avert it.
The present research
Identifying suicide attackers’ motivations is tricky at best. Successful attackers, those who
managed to kill themselves in the process, aren’t there to be interviewed. Those who have
failed or were caught prior to committing the attack can be interrogated,51 but even they
may not have veridical insights into what motives may have prompted their actions.52
Additionally, samples of survivors are likely to be small and possibly unrepresentative of
the population of attackers who succeeded in carrying out their mission.
In the present study, we examined open-source reports of suicide attackers for state-
ments and depictions suggestive of motivation. This information was then coded as an
indication of significance loss or significance gain motives, in order to examine how these




Ariel Merari of Tel Aviv University provided the preliminary database containing 2284
individual suicide attackers (with global scope and attack dates from 1974–2008). We
included only a targeted subset of cases (n = 786), excluding those in Iraq or Afghanistan,
due to limited availability of open-source information about individual suicide attackers in
these countries. It is important to note that the original database was created without any
knowledge of SQT, thus eliminating any potential selection bias imbued by our theoretical
perspective. We first vetted this preliminary data set by a) locating the original data
sources, b) double-checking all entered variables, and c) excluding all cases (n = 5;
0.006% of the total cases) where questions remained about whether the incident con-
stituted a suicide attack. A team of researchers then conducted a systematic open-source
expansion through the use of general Internet searches (e.g., Lexis Nexis, Google, terrorist




























organizational websites) and various terrorism databases.53 Information on the motiva-
tions and precipitating causes of suicide attacks was extracted without regard to specific
content, and later coded according to categories of theoretical interest. Specifically, we
searched for information about the attackers’ or organizations’ motives for committing the
attacks, personal information about the attacker and/or the attacker’s family/friends, and
the intended targets of attack.
Data coding
The coding scheme was derived from top-down (theory-driven) and bottom-up (data
driven) methods. Two researchers independently coded the qualitative information. A
third researcher reconciled any differences between them. In the final stage, a fourth
researcher reviewed the reconciliation coder’s work, and indicated any coding disagree-
ments. As the codes were dichotomous (i.e., either present or absent), inter-rater reliabil-
ities between the reconciliation coder’s ratings and the final researcher’s ratings were
calculated using Cohen’s kappa (see Table 1). The coding categories are described below.
Significance loss
Motivations or circumstances representing significance loss were organized into four
meso-level categories representing varieties of loss (see Table 1). Shame represented
various circumstances that would bring humiliation to either the individual suicide
attacker or his/her family, or information concerning the individual’s motivation to
alleviate shame. Family death comprised the death of parent(s), sibling(s), or significant
Table 1. Variables used to identify significance quest motivation.
Macro-level Meso-level Micro-level
Category Category Frequency Category
Significance Loss
(Cohen’s κ = .72)
Shame 15 Attacker allegedly committed adultery
Attacker was allegedly infertile
Attacker allegedly collaborated with “enemy”
Attacker wanted to alleviate shame
Attacker’s parents were divorced
Family member was allegedly infertile
Family member allegedly committed adultery
Family member allegedly collaborated with “enemy”
Family member wanted to alleviate family shame
Family member was unemployed
Family member had a personal failure
Family death 23 Attacker was a widower
One or both of attacker’s parents was deceased
Attacker’s sibling(s) were deceased
Conflict 3 Attacker had fight or breakup with romantic partner or family
member
Attacker was divorced
Failure 20 Attacker was currently unemployed
Attacker had a personal failure
Significance gain
(Cohen’s κ = .76)
Reward 7 Attacker paid or financially supported by sponsor prior to attack
Attacker’s family financially supported post-mortem
Purpose 7 Attacker wanted a sense of purpose or meaning in life
Attacker allegedly lacked life direction/purpose before attack
Religious
Martyrdom
94 Attacker wanted to fight in jihad, struggle, holy war
Attacker wanted to be a religious martyr




























other(s). Relationship conflict captured various forms of conflict the attacker experienced
with his/her partner or family prior to the attack. Failure represented the attacker’s
experience of personal failure or unemployment.
Significance gain
A similar process was implemented to tap significance gain, wherein various gain-relevant
circumstances were organized in three meso-level categories (see Table 1). The first
category, reward, was used if either the attacker or a family member received monetary
payment for the attack. The purpose code was used if the attacker was described as having
lacked purpose prior to becoming a suicide terrorist or if he or she expressed wanting to
find purpose in his/her life. And finally, the motivation to become a religious martyr or to
participate in jihad or holy war was assigned to the category of religious martyrdom.54
Demographics
Demographic information was coded regarding the attacker’s gender, age, highest level of
education (1 = illiterate, 4 = primary/elementary completed, 7 = high school completed,
10 = university completed, 12 = advanced degree completed), marital status (single vs.
married), and number of children.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Open-source information on attackers’ motives for committing the attacks and personal
information about the attacker and/or the attacker’s family/friends were only available for a
subset of cases. This enabled us to determine the presence or absence of the aforemen-
tioned motivational categories for 219 cases (27.6% of the original sample of 781).55
Attacker ethnic group information was available for all 219 cases. Palestinian (37.9%),
Arab-Palestinian (26.5%), and Arab (17.4%) constituted the most frequently represented
groups. The remaining 18.2% of cases belonged to nine different ethnic groups (see
Table 2). Information on age, education, and number of children was available for 201
(91.7%), 127 (58.0%), and 100 (45.7%) cases, respectively. Results revealed the average
suicide attacker to be relatively educated (M = 7.48, SD = 2.07; i.e., high school graduate),
relatively young (M = 23.78, SD = 6.19), and without children (M = 0.70, SD = 1.68).
Table 2. Frequencies and percentages of attacker’s ethnic or cultural group.









































Information on gender and marital status was available for 219 (100%) and 160 (73.1%)
cases, respectively. The sample was predominantly male (86.8%) and single (85.0%). Given
the varied availability of information, individual analysis utilized different sample sizes (i.e.,
analyses of age pertain to 201 participants, whereas analyses of gender pertain to 219 cases).
Presence of the significance quest motive: The research hypotheses
Personal significance quest codes
Of the 219 cases, 149 (68.04%) contained information indicative of a significance loss or
gain motive: Ninety-one evinced gain, thirty-seven evinced loss, and twenty-one evinced
the presence of both motivations. For the remaining seventy individuals, qualitative
information was available and coded by researchers, but it did not pertain to either
significance gain or loss. Table 1 shows the frequencies of the meso-level significance
quest codes, organized by their superordinate categories. Attackers received a code (0 =
absent, 1 = present) indicating the presence of one of these superordinate motives, but that
motive could have been evidenced by multiple meso-level codes (e.g., an attacker that
experienced both shame and family death would have the same significance loss code as an
attacker that only experienced shame). Therefore, the frequencies in Table 1 exceed the
total number of attackers with available significance quest information.
Significance quest differences by ethnicity
We first examined cultural differences. Individuals identified as Arab, Palestinian, or
Arab-Palestinian were collapsed into a single group. Given insufficient numbers of the
remaining ethnic groups (see Table 2), they were likewise collapsed into a single group of
“all other attackers,” and compared to Arab-Palestinians. Analyses first examined demo-
graphic differences between these groups. Age, education, and number of children were
subjected to separate one-way ANOVAs with ethnicity as the predictor. The groups only
differed on education level (all other ps > .479), F(1, 126) = 5.43, p = .021, η2 = .04, with
Arab-Palestinians being significantly more educated (M = 7.64, SD = 1.80) than other
attackers (M = 6.33, SD = 2.31). Separate binary logistic regressions with ethnicity (0 =
Arab-Palestinian, 1 = other) predicting gender (0 = female, 1 = male) and marital status
(0 = single, 1 = married) were also conducted. Arab-Palestinian attackers were nearly
seven times more likely to be male (92.1%) than other attackers (63.4%): χ2(1, N = 219) =
19.33, p < .001, β = –1.91, p < .001, OR = 6.76. Likewise, Arab-Palestinian attackers were
76% less likely to be married (12.4%) than other attackers (37.5%): χ2(1, N = 161) = 5.65,
p = .018, β = –1.44, p = .012, OR = .24. Although both groups (Arab-Palestinian vs. others)
were predominantly male and single, these proportions were significantly more
pronounced among Arab-Palestinians.
We then examined whether the significance quest manifested differently for Arab-
Palestinians relative to other attackers. Separate binary logistic regressions were conducted
on the presence of significance loss and gain (0 = absent, 1 = present). Arab-Palestinian
attackers were 63% less likely to have suffered significance loss (22.5%) than other attackers
(43.9%): χ2(1, N = 219) = 7.28, p = .007, β = –.99, p = .006, OR = .37. Arab-Palestinian
attackers, on the other hand, were nearly three times more likely to have anticipated
significance gain (55.6%) relative to other attackers (31.7%): χ2(1, N = 219) = 8.21,
p = .004, β = 1.05, p = .006, OR = 2.85. Supplemental analyses revealed that this difference




























on significance gain was predominantly driven by the emphasis placed on religious
martyrdom within Arab-Palestinian suicide bomber culture. Analyses conducted using a
code comprised of all forms of gain except religious martyrdom failed to reveal cultural
differences: χ2(1, N = 219) = 1.00, p = .317.
In the sections that follow, we examined our hypotheses regarding gender, education,
age, and family status on significance loss and gain. Given the above-described cultural
differences, all subsequent analyses included ethnicity. This enabled us to examine
whether the various demographics interacted with ethnicity, or had effects on significance
loss and gain above and beyond the already found ethnic group differences.
Significance quest differences by gender
Based on evidence that women have higher BIS, that is, avoidance oriented (but not BAS)
scale scores than men,56 we specifically hypothesized greater odds of loss motivation
among women. We, therefore, conducted a binary logistic regression with gender (0 =
female; 1 = male), ethnicity, and their interaction predicting the presence of significance
loss. The interaction was not significant (p = .616), so it was removed. The subsequent
model predicted significance loss: χ2(2, N = 219) = 15.22, p < .001. Only the gender effect
was significant: β = 1.24, p = .005, OR = 3.45. As such, after controlling for ethnicity
(p = .097), female attackers were three and half times more likely to have suffered a
significance loss than males.
Females were also expected to have a higher likelihood of significance loss reasons for
embarking on suicidal missions that were related to relational concerns, namely, family
death and relationship conflict. In many instances, it has been noted that an individual’s
decision to volunteer for a suicide mission was prompted by the loss of a significant
person (or persons) in one’s life. Consider the case of Hnadi Taisir Jaradat, who killed
twenty-one and wounded sixty, during her attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, Israel.
Four months prior, Jaradat witnessed the killing of her younger brother and cousin (who
also happened to be her lover) at the hands of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Analyses
of the Chechnyan Black Widows also attest that the decision to volunteer for suicide
missions occurred in the wake of having a spouse or fiancé killed by the enemy.57 We
hypothesized that having a close person wrested away from oneself induces a sense of
helplessness and powerlessness. Given the importance of relationship concerns to women,
relative to their male counterparts, such instances should be more prominent in the
motives of female attackers.
In the family death analyses, the interaction term was again non-significant (p = .406)
and hence it was removed. The resulting model predicted family death: χ2(2, N = 219) =
29.19, p < .001. After controlling for ethnicity (p = .60), female attackers were thirteen times
more likely to experience a family death than were males: β = 2.57, p < .001, OR = 13.09. As
for relationship conflict, although the omnibus test was significant, χ2(2, N = 219) = 5.82,
p = .054, neither ethnicity (p = .297) nor gender (p = .131) were significant predictors.
Binary logistic regressions were also performed on indicators of significance gain. The
interaction was once again removed because it was non-significant (p = .743). The resulting
model predicted significance gain: χ2(2, N = 219) = 13.76, p = .001. In contrast to the
significance loss results, after controlling for culture (p = .060), females were 67% less likely
than males to have evinced the significance gain motivation: β = –1.11, p = .019, OR = .33.




























Significance quest differences by educational level
As elaborated earlier, we expected greater significance gain motivation among highly
educated attackers. Education level was treated as a continuous variable, as it consisted
of twelve monotonically increasing levels, beginning with illiteracy and ending with
completion of an advanced degree. There was no Ethnicity × Education interaction
(p = .161), so the term was removed from the model. Although the omnibus test was
only marginal, χ2(1, N = 127) = 4.71, p = .095, there was a significant effect of education,
β = .21, p = .042, OR = 1.23, but not of ethnicity (p = .867). As can be seen in Figure 1, as
education level increased, the probability that an attacker experienced a gain motivation
increased. Take for instance an individual whose highest level of education was the
completion of primary school (i.e., a “4” in Figure 1). If this attacker was Kurdish, he
was predicted to have a 38% chance of experiencing significance gain. If that same
individual were Arab, he would have a nearly identical 41% chance of gain. No differences
as a function of education or ethnicity were found for the presence of significance loss: χ2
(1, N = 127) = 4.16, p = .245.
Significance quest differences by age
Given past research on loss prevention58 and the search for meaning or purpose,59
we expected that as age increased, loss would predominate over gain motivation. We
first examined significance gain. Once again, ethnicity did not interact with our predictor
(p = .144), so the interaction term was removed from the model. Although the resulting
model was significant, χ2(2, N = 201) = 11.02, p = .004, this was driven solely by the
previously reported cultural difference (p = .002), hence age was not a significant predictor
of gain (p = .998).
Analyses conducted on significance loss indicators, however, confirmed our hypotheses:
χ2(2, N = 201) = 12.78, p = .002. In this case, the interaction was not significant (p = .114).
There was a significant effect of age, such that after controlling for the significant effect of
ethnicity, β = –1.08, p = .006, OR = .34, the odds of experiencing loss increased with age:
β = .07, p = .028, OR = 1.07. Although the probability of loss increased with age for all
Figure 1. Significance gain as a function of education level and ethnicity. Note. Education was coded
such that 1 = illiterate, 4 = primary/elementary completed, 7 = high school completed, 10 = university
completed, 12 = advanced degree completed.




























types of attackers, at every age level, Arab-Palestinian attackers were roughly 20% less
likely to have experienced loss. For instance, a 17-year-old Chechen or Tamil attacker was
predicted to have a 37% chance of significance loss, whereas his or her 17-year-old
counterpart in Palestine was predicted to have only a 17% chance of loss (see Figure 2).
Significance quest differences by family status
Suicide attackers who are married and/or have children should have more to lose, and
should therefore be more motivated by significance loss than their single and childless
counterparts. There were no effects of marital status on either significance loss or gain
(ps = .759 and .472, respectively). Analyses of the number of children, likewise, failed to
predict significance gain (p = .257). There was, however, an Ethnicity × Children inter-
action on the presence of significance loss: χ2(3, N = 100) = 15.16, p = .002, β = 2.13,
p = .055, OR = 8.42. As depicted in Figure 3, this hypothesis was supported among Arab-
Figure 2. Significance loss as a function of age and ethnicity.
Figure 3. Significance loss as a function of number of children and ethnicity.




























Palestinian attackers—as the number of children increased, the probability of experiencing
loss also increased: β = .34, p = .031. The effect was in the opposite direction yet not
significant for all other attackers: β = –1.79, p = .102. This latter effect should be
interpreted with caution as data was missing for 75% of the non-Arab-Palestinian cases.
Moreover, number of children was correlated with age: r(96) = .78, p < .001. In a binary
logistic regression controlling for age, the Ethnicity × Children interaction was reduced to
non-significance (p = .999), demonstrating that age differences fully accounted for the
effect of number of children on the presence of loss.
Significance quest and number of casualties
Given the proposition that the actions of a suicide attacker are driven by significance
quest, those individuals with the greatest yearning for significance may also feel like they
have more riding on their actions. This could ultimately translate into the latter indivi-
duals being more effective attackers, as measured by the number of casualties per assault.
Number of casualties was operationalized with two variables: number killed and number
wounded. Both variables were positively skewed (Killed: Skewness = 5.16, SE = .17;
Wounded: Skewness: 4.56, SE = .17), as most attacks resulted in few casualties. A constant
(1) was thus added to each score and a logarithmic (log10) transformation was conducted
to improve the skew to acceptable levels (Killed: Skewness = 1.50, SE = .17; Wounded:
Skewness = .42, SE = .17).
In the analyses reported thus far, we did not have predictions regarding the degree of
quest motivation, but merely the presence of specific forms of quest motivation. For
instance, although we predicted (and found) that significance loss was more likely to be
present for female (vs. male) attackers, we did not predict females would have more
instances of loss than males. Indeed, if females are more motivated by loss, a single
incident of family death may be sufficient to push them toward extreme behavior.
Nonetheless, it is of interest to consider whether the different sources of significance
motivation exert a cumulative effect. We thus created a continuous measure of that
motivation by summing over all of its sources at the micro-level. Scores ranged from
0–4, with 0 representing no indication of significance quest, and four representing an
individual with four different indicators of that quest (M = .94, SD = .95). The same
process was repeated specifically summing only instances of significance loss (range = 0–4;
M = .33, SD = .67), and only instances of significance gain (range = 0–3; M = .61,
SD = .75).
We first examined if other variables in the dataset related to casualties. Past research
suggests that women, educated, and older attackers may be more likely to perpetrate high-
casualty attacks.60 In the present sample, only education was related to number killed, r
(127) = .22, p = .015, and wounded, r(120) = .18, p = .054 (all other ps > .10). We thus
conducted partial correlations controlling for the effect of education. As predicted, even
after controlling for education, degree of significance quest was positively and significantly
correlated with both number killed, r(124) = .47, p < .001, and wounded, r(117) = .38, p <
.001. Similarly, degree of gain correlated with number killed, r(124) = .52, p < .001, and
wounded, r(117) = .37, p < .001, but degree of loss did not (both ps > .21).
Finally, we ruled out the alternative explanation that these significant correlations may
be an artifact of high-casualty attacks receiving greater press and journalistic attention,
therefore leading to a greater amount of motivational information available in open-




























source reports.61 If this were the case, attackers with more available information would
also commit higher casualty attacks. Attackers ranged from having five pieces of informa-
tion to having as many as twenty-one pieces of information (M = 12.37, SD = 2.67).
Amount of information, however, was not correlated with number killed or wounded
(both ps > .10), and when controlling for this variable, the previously reported correlations
remained significant (all ps < .005).
Discussion
Analyses carried out on a database of suicide attackers yielded results regarding a) the
relationship between the significance quest motivation and potency of the suicide attack,
and b) systematic differences in the manifestation of the significance quest motive
according to various demographics. More specifically, the analyses looking at attack
potency revealed that this relationship between significance quest motivation and casual-
ties was driven by significance gain, not loss. There are several possible explanations for
this correlation. First, the stronger the significance gain motivation, implied by the
number of relevant indicators, the greater might be individuals’ effort toward ensuring
success in their attack. Secondly, an intense yearning for high levels of significance could
be related to an increased willingness to volunteer for high-value targets that involve high
casualties. These high-value targets are likely more crucial to success of the insurgent
group and more likely to receive ample media attention. Consequently, these attacks pose
a greater potential for significance gain. Thirdly, and relatedly, the organizational launch-
ers of suicide attacks could specifically recruit individuals with a stronger significance
yearning for high-value targets because of the assumption that they will be more insistent
and ultimately more successful. In this vein, past research has found that older and more
educated attackers are more likely to be involved in both highly important missions, and
missions that resulted in high numbers of casualties.62 The present research suggests that,
along with maturity and intellect, an intense yearning for significance may render attack-
ers particularly valuable to terrorist outfits.
An interesting question for future research, however, is why these correlations were not
likewise found between the degree of significance loss and number of casualties. It could
be that gain and loss motivations operate differently. One could imagine that circum-
stances that increase the quest for significance gain have an additive effect on behavior—
the more enveloped one is in the search for supreme meaning or significance, the more
committed one becomes and the more attracted one is to high-value targets, as discussed
above. Attackers with increasing experiences of loss, on the other hand, may often become
dejected, stuck in a state of learned helplessness, or be unsure of their own abilities. They
may perceive suicide bombing as a remedy to this state, but be unwilling to volunteer for
high-value attacks because of their lesser likelihood of success. It is also possible that
redeeming a loss, like prevention focus,63 requires merely a return to a base line of
significance, whereas effecting a gain, like promotion focus, requires exceeding the baseline
of significance and attaining greater impact, which possibly requires greater effort that
translates into impact as measured by casualties.
Additionally, and of particular interest, we found that the manifestation of the signifi-
cance quest motivation varied systematically in accordance with attackers’ ethnicity, gen-
der, age, and education. The majority of the present sample was Arab-Palestinian in origin.




























Although the agreed-upon characterization of suicide attackers is male, young, single, and
relatively educated,64 this characterization was more pronounced among Arab-Palestinian
attackers in our sample. It has been suggested that the greater proportion of males in these
regions is due to the emphasis on Islamic fundamentalism, but future research may wish to
examine this directly.65 Arab-Palestinian attackers were also less likely to have experienced
significance loss, and more likely to have anticipated significance gain, an effect apparently
driven by the emphasis placed on martyrdom among Arab attackers.
Female attackers, relative to males, had greater odds of significance loss, and lower
odds of significance gain. The latter finding was unexpected given the absence of
gender differences in gain motivation found in previous research using the
approach-related BAS scale.66 Approach motivation may manifest differently in cul-
tures represented in our sample than in cultures where gender differences in approach
motivation have been previously investigated.67 Women in our sample (e.g.,
Palestinian, Kurdish, Islamic) might be discouraged from significance gain goals
(e.g., seeking honor or a sense of meaning in life), and encouraged to pursue less
“ambitious” goals commensurate with culturally prescribed gender roles. This sugges-
tion is consistent with observations made about the Chechen Black Widow suicide
attackers who, after the experience of trauma, took on more “emancipated” roles that
were previously reserved for men.68
We especially found that female attackers had greater odds of a death in the family
precipitating their attack. We did not find, however, that female attackers had greater odds
of having an interpersonal conflict prior to the attack. Note that a relationship conflict
does not necessarily represent the breakdown of social ties per se. Indeed, single episodes
of conflict have no lingering negative impact on individuals’ satisfaction with
relationships,69 and relationship bonds only tend to disintegrate in the face of protracted
and recurring conflict.70 It is possible that the latter conflicts were rare or completely
absent in our sample.
Analyses also revealed that more educated attackers had greater odds of the signifi-
cance gain motivation. Getting an education is a forward-looking process wherein gains
in knowledge are sought out. Immersion in educational activity may thus attest to a gain
orientation. Age, on the other hand, was predictive of significance loss but not gain
motivation. Thus, and consistent with past research,71 younger and older attackers did
not differ in the extent to which a gain code was present, but older attackers were more
likely to have evinced an instance of significance loss. It appears that age-bred realism
and the investment in relations and possessions (i.e., having things to lose) may well
contribute to a loss orientation. Indeed, within our sample, older attackers were more
likely to have family situations indicative of having more to lose, married attackers were
significantly older (M = 27.87, SD = 6.57) than single attackers (M = 21.72, SD = 3.11),
F(1, 157) = 51.86, p < .001; η2 = .25, and number of children increased with age: r(96) =
.78, p < .001. Interestingly, though, marital status was unrelated to significance loss, and
the relationship between number of children and significance loss was entirely explained
by age. This suggests that although these important changes in one’s life likely con-
tribute to a shift toward an avoidance or prevention orientation, at least in the present
sample, it was the third variable of age that accounted for both the family circumstances
(number of children) and the found motivational differences in loss versus gain
emphasis.




























Limitations of the present study
Though the present research offers a rare quantitative glimpse at suicide attackers, several
limitations warrant explicit acknowledgement. First, our method of analysis on its own is
not a sufficient test of significance quest theory. Rather, the SQT framework guided our
exploration of the data and proved helpful in obtaining novel findings related to demo-
graphics as well as the motivational antecedents of destructive impact (number of casual-
ties) of suicide attackers. Further empirical tools, such as experimental manipulations or
qualitative discussions, however, are needed to provide a rigorous test of the mechanisms
at work in significance quest processes. Much could be learned from research taking a
multi-pronged approach, and we hope the present findings may serve to inspire and
complement such efforts. Furthermore, the analyses are based on available open-source
information that differed in its degree of completeness for different attackers, and might
have been systematically biased. Open-source information likely over-emphasizes personal
details about attackers, as this might be the only type of information journalists can
ascertain, short of infiltrating terrorist groups. The depiction of female suicide attackers
in terms of significance gain might also be deemed inappropriate by informational sources
(i.e., the attackers’ family, friends, neighbors, media, or the attacker herself) because of
prominent cultural or genders mores, and consequently might have been deliberately
eschewed in reports on which our analyses were based. Similarly, media may have over-
relied on portrayals of suicide attackers as martyrs for a cause. This could have artificially
inflated the presence of religious martyrdom, which was the most common instance of
significance gain in our database.
Secondly, the present research omitted cases from Afghanistan and Iraq because of
limited availability of open-source information. Reports suggest that Afghani attackers
may differ importantly from those in other regions—i.e., that they may be less effective,
older, less educated, showing high incidence of physical disabilities, and lesser emphasis
on martyrdom.72 Suicide attackers in Iraq, on the other hand, may differ from the present
sample in their emphasis on martyrdom and in their transnational nature, often hailing
from neighboring Arab states or Europe.73 These differences might translate into different
results than those reported herein, and a complete understanding of the motivational
underpinnings of suicidal terrorism would necessitate examining these attackers as well.
However, the fact that most of the demographic differences in our current sample held
after controlling for cultural differences suggests that the findings might also hold with the
inclusion of Afghani or Iraqi attacks.
Thirdly, the sample did not include a comparison condition of non-suicidal terrorists.
Thus we did not aim to distinguish motivations of suicide attackers from other extremists,
but to understand how a specific broad motivational category of special interest (i.e.,
significance quest) manifests for various types of suicide attackers. Indeed, SQT suggests
that the pursuit of significance via intergroup violence may be a general phenomenon not
necessarily reserved for suicidal activities.74 The quest for significance may also characterize
non-suicide extremists, given that their actions likely reflect commitment to their cause and
a relative reduction in pursuit of other personal objectives and life aspirations. It is thus
possible that motivational differences between suicide and non-suicide attackers would vary
in the degree to which the individual focused exclusively on achieving significance through
martyrdom, versus considering alternative routes to significance, and alternative objectives.




























A conjunctive look at the demographic findings
The demographic differences in motivational foci outlined in the present analysis are
interesting in and of themselves, but they examine each demographic characteristic in
isolation. Suicide attackers are not characterized exclusively by a single demographic (say,
their gender), but at the same time by the remaining demographics (i.e., their ethnicity,
age, education, and family status). Looking at these qualities conjunctively is quite telling.
In our database, the “typical” suicide bomber was a single, somewhat educated, Arab-
Palestinian male in his early 20s. This confluence of traits creates a “perfect storm” of
significance gain motivation. As reported previously, a) men were more likely to have a
significance gain circumstance, and less likely to have a significance loss orientation.
Similarly, b) educated and c) Arab-Palestinian attackers were more likely to have sig-
nificance gain. Although we cannot make any conclusive claims on this basis, the present
findings suggest that the typical Palestinian suicide bomber, relative to his or her less
typical counterpart, may see suicide attacks less as a means of redeeming humiliation or
eradicating lost significance, and more as an avenue to potential glory, fame, or hero/
martyr status. Consider Saheib Abdulrahim Timr, an attacker responsible for driving a car
bomb into an Israeli school bus, killing eight and wounding more than forty others. Saheib
was a “typical” bomber—male, single, 18 years old, and attending university during the
time of his attack. There is no indication that he experienced any type of significance loss,
at least not personally. The only indication of motive was his yearning for martyrdom
status. Indeed, he came from a family of Hamas activists, and it was reported that his path
to jihad began very early in life.
Correspondingly, our evidence suggests that the power of loss may motivate women
and older individuals—those with “atypical” qualities—to join the ranks of suicide attack-
ers. Fatima Omar Muhammed Al-Najar is a clear example as a 57-year-old woman
without evidence of a formal education. Fatima detonated an explosive device while
approaching IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, Israel. Fatima witnessed the killing of sixty
civilians during the shelling of Beit Hanon, she lived in a one-room shack because her
home had been demolished, she lost her husband a year prior, a son and grandson were
killed by Israelis, another grandson was crippled, and finally, five of her seven sons had
spent time in Israeli jails. This overwhelming slew of losses may very well have been her
impetus for becoming a suicide attacker.
Conclusion
The present findings afforded insights into systematic variations of the significance quest
motive as a function of demographic characteristics. Should the results be replicated,
and the limitations addressed, they would carry potentially important implications for
counter-radicalization policy and guide differential counter-radicalization strategies for
segments of vulnerable populations. For instance, counter-radicalization strategies
aimed at the motivational foci of highly effective groups—the educated, female, and
older attackers that often commit high-value, high-casualty attacks75—may prove fruit-
ful in reducing the use of suicide attacks as the strategy of choice among terrorist
organizations.
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